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CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2019
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) SECOND MEETING OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
WORKING GROUP, OCTOBER 29, 2009

REF: GENEVA 0977 (SFO-GVA-VI-038)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-040.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: October 29, 2009
Time: 3:00 - 6:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) The second meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group (MOUWG) during the sixth round of negotiations and sixth MOUWG meeting overall was held at the Russian Mission on October 29, 2009. General Orlov opened by commenting on the U.S. START Follow-on (SFO) package provided to the Russian Federation in Moscow. He said the United States employed a good strategy by proposing the package at the highest possible level. The Russian Delegation had not yet received an official translation of the package but, based on the morning briefing provided by the U.S. Delegation, Russia would request clarification on a few issues to include: the 800 strategic delivery vehicle limit; counting rules associated with determining deployed and non-deployed systems; and provisions regarding heavy bombers. The Russian Delegation expressed disagreement with the U.S. concept of "considered to contain" and pressed the U.S. Delegation to explain how the concept could work in a treaty

designed to count deployed strategic offensive arms (SOA).

¶4. (S) The sides continued to review the U.S. MOU joint draft text (JDT), making several editorial changes and agreeing to delete duplicative information. The Russian Delegation also explained that its proposed term "basing area" would replace the term "restricted area." General Poznihir explained that "basing areas" would be located within the boundaries of an ICBM base for road-mobile launchers, but did not define the size of the road-mobile base, the size of a "basing area" or what term Russia would propose to replace "fixed structure." Russia clarified, however, that the United States would receive new site diagrams with updated terminology and coordinates, and with "fixed structures" noted on the site diagram once the issue was resolved.

¶5. (S) During a discussion on the Russian proposal to combine space launch facilities with test ranges, Mr. Trout delivered talking points stating that the United States rejected the Russian proposal to merge the two facilities, primarily on the basis that activities at space launch facilities were dissimilar to activities at test ranges and were not associated with SOA. Therefore, space launch facilities should not be inspectable. Russia explained that the proposal was intended to increase transparency by allowing both facilities to be subject to inspection.

¶6. (U) Subject Summary: Let Us Take a Look at your Package; A Review of the MOU JDT; What Exactly Do You Mean By "Considered to Contain?"; TMOMs are Support Equipment So

Should Not Count; Politically Correct Terminology for Road-Mobile; More Counting Missiles at the Production Facility; Heavy Bombers; and, U.S. Rejected Merging Space Launch Facilities with Test Ranges.

LET US TAKE A LOOK
AT YOUR PACKAGE

¶7. (S) Orlov opened the meeting by stating the United States had employed a good strategy by proposing its SFO package at the highest possible levels. The package would require thorough study and, once the appropriate political decisions were made, the sides would decide how to proceed. He said strategy is strategy and this is a situation where the Russians could learn from the United States. Orlov said that the Russians had a few informal questions regarding the package based on what was briefed by the U.S. Delegation earlier that morning. Russia would need clarification on what exactly would be included in the proposed 800 SDV limit.

He commented that the sides still needed to decide how to distinguish between deployed and non-deployed and there would be much discussion ahead on heavy bombers. Noting that such issues related to counting rules, Orlov suggested that discussing these topics did not fall outside the framework of the MOUWG.

¶8. (S) Trout agreed that the morning discussion of the U.S. proposal was interesting, as new concepts had been introduced and Russia would need time for review. With the understanding that the Russian Delegation would advise senior leaders in Moscow, Trout clarified that the U.S. side was prepared to clarify any questions, but that those issues should be addressed in the Ad Hoc Group. Trout proposed a review of the MOU JDT.

A REVIEW OF THE MOU JDT

¶9. (S) Orlov referenced a discussion about non-deployed delivery vehicles during the morning Ad Hoc Group meeting (REFTEL) and suggested the sides accept the category, "Non-Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and Heavy Bombers," under Section

I Aggregate Numbers. Trout responded that, despite an interesting discussion of new concepts introduced during the morning meeting, the U.S. position had not changed. Orlov asked to have all technical data moved to the third tier. Trout said the United States would consider the proposal, but the sides still needed to reach an understanding on the function of the third tier.

¶10. (S) Orlov questioned the title of MOU Section II stating that the U.S. concept "ICBMs and Their Associated Launchers" was senseless. Orlov said that Dr. Warner had proposed alternative thoughts during the morning meeting. Trout repeated that concepts mentioned during the morning meeting would be considered, but the U.S. position had not changed. The Russian side then proposed to change titles and categories of data so that the wording would be more clear in Russian. For example, the Section II title would read "ICBMs, Launchers of ICBMs, and Warheads Deployed

(razmeshony) on Them." (Begin comment: The Russian interpreter used the word deployed, however, the word that Orlov proposed was "razmeshony," meaning placed or arranged. The Russian word for deployed is razvernuty. End comment.) The Russians also repeated their disagreement with the U.S.-proposed term "nuclear warhead" and proposed deleting the term "nuclear."

¶11. (S) In the interest of simplifying Section II, Poznihir suggested removing the categories "Test Launcher" and "Training Launchers" and just listing such launchers under the category "Non-Deployed Launchers of ICBMs." Trout responded that mobile launchers should be a separate category. Returning to a previous argument, Poznihir questioned why the U.S. proposed a separate category of data for mobile test launchers as a sub-category under test launchers. In that case, he argued fixed test launchers should also be a sub-category. Trout reminded Poznihir that, under the U.S. proposal, non-deployed mobile training and test launchers are limited which was why the category was necessary. Poznihir responded that data for non-deployed mobile test and training launchers was listed later in the Annex on Reference Data, for example, under Test Ranges. With that in mind, Poznihir argued that removing the sub-categories from Section II should not affect limitations so he did not see a need to duplicate information. (Begin comment: The Russians refer to the MOU as the Annex on Reference Data. End comment.) The sides agreed to delete the Russian-proposed Section II category of data "Non-Deployed ICBMs" in the aggregate information for a silo ICBM base since the data is recorded at the maintenance facility.

WHAT EXACTLY DO YOU MEAN
BY "CONSIDERED TO CONTAIN?"

¶12. (S) Poznihir again proposed adding the category "non-deployed launchers of ICBMs" in Section I Aggregate Numbers, noting that the United States would have such launchers for its MX/Peacekeeper ICBM and asked whether the United States agreed. Trout said it would depend on counting rules. Under the U.S. counting rules, Trout explained, the category would not be acceptable, however, if Russian counting rules were adopted, then maybe it would. Referring to silos being converted at Tatischevo Silo ICBM Base, Poznihir asked how U.S. counting rules would apply to an ICBM silo launcher undergoing conversion. He reasoned that if a launcher is being converted it cannot launch an ICBM so why should it count as "deployed." He said that such a conversion could take over a year and it would make no sense to count a launcher as deployed when it would be incapable of launching a missile.

¶13. (S) Trout responded that, under the U.S. proposal, a deployed launcher of an ICBM remains deployed even if it is empty. A silo being converted would count as having the old

type of missile deployed in it until it was loaded with a missile of the new type. For example, a silo being converted at Tatischevo would count as deployed with an SS-19 ICBM until an SS-27 ICBM or TMOM was emplaced in the launcher, just as under START. However, warheads would not be counted.

Seemingly baffled by the explanation, Poznihir argued that those were rules under the old treaty and that we were now negotiating a new treaty. The new treaty would deal with counting operationally deployed ICBMs and warheads.

¶14. (S) Orlov said he was still trying to digest how the United States planned to count deployed and non-deployed ICBMs and launchers. Orlov asked whether conversion was unlimited in time, and whether those launchers would still be considered to be deployed during that time. Trout answered that they would because, under the U.S. concept, a launcher is considered to be deployed from birth to elimination. Orlov stated that, according to this logic, neither side will have non-deployed items, so why even discuss distinguishing between them. He moved on to SSBNs saying that, under the U.S. concept, an SSBN and its launchers will be considered to be deployed from the moment of production until they are destroyed, and the same goes for ICBM silos, or at least until they are filled with gravel. Referring to heavy bombers, Poznihir added that they would all be counted as deployed under the U.S. concept.

¶15. (S) Looking for clarification, Novikov explained his understanding of "considered to contain"; an empty silo is considered to contain a deployed SDV, but warheads do not count. Trout confirmed this statement. Novikov reasoned that if an SDV is considered to be deployed, then the warheads should also count. He asked why the United States would count a delivery vehicle as deployed even if it is not in its silo, and yet not count the warheads--then propose to count warheads on heavy bombers even if they are not deployed on them.

¶16. (S) Trout responded that Mr. Elliott had raised this issue in the morning meeting and explained the U.S. position. Orlov responded he did not understand the U.S. position. Posing a rhetorical question, Orlov asked how one would explain to an officer of long-range aviation that a nuclear-armed heavy bomber counts as having zero warheads. Orlov said it would have been a better idea to attribute a bomber with 100 warheads for example. Under this concept, the heavy bombers and their bases would still be subject to verification measures. Orlov claimed Elliott had said during the morning meeting that all the LRNA would be moved from the base to central storage and then moved back. He said Russia would need clarification. Trout responded that some LRNA would be moved to central storage, but others would remain at the air base.

¶17. (S) Pischulov asked how the U.S. concept of "considered to contain" would be applied to SSBNs at production facilities. Specifically, will an SSBN be "considered to contain" even if it is not operational at sea. Trout explained that under U.S. counting rules, the SSBN launchers would count once the SSBN is launched. Just like under START, he continued, the SSBN is accountable from birth until elimination. Pischulov argued that the SSBN is not strategically operational at sea. (Begin comment: A Russian SSBN at the production facility is still under control of the design bureau and not under control of the Navy. End comment.) Pischulov proposed that the SSBN fall under accountability only once it arrived at the operational base. He argued that if an SSBN at the production facility is

accountable, then the sides should list the hull. Pischulov continued that an SSBN could return to the production facility after sea trials or later in its operational life. Since the U.S. proposed adding the category SSBN hull at

submarine bases for SLBMs, and since there would be notification requirements regarding the SSBN location, then it would be reasonable to add the category "SSBN Hull" to production facility as well. Trout said the United States would take the point under consideration.

¶18. (S) Not wanting to let go of the counting rules debate, Orlov asked another rhetorical question. If the United States were to build a new SSBN, hold a ceremony as it is launched, then, at that moment, the SSBN and its launchers would both count as deployed. Trout replied that Orlov was correct. Orlov asked about the warheads. Trout explained the warheads would not count until the SSBN arrived at base and SLBMs were loaded in the launch tubes. Orlov countered asking why should the launchers count at the production facility. Trout repeated the concept of "considered to contain" and that an SSBN and its launchers count once the SSBN is launched. He reminded Orlov that the point was raised in the morning meeting and the United States would take a closer look at the concept. Orlov once again described the U.S. concept and said the Russian word to describe it was "nesurazny," (meaning, ridiculous) because an SSBN without SLBMs loaded inside it could not contain deployed SLBMs no matter what term was used.

TMOMS ARE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
SO SHOULD NOT COUNT

¶19. (S) Moving away from the discussion on counting rules, Poznihir said that Russia did not intend to designate training models of missiles (TMOM) as a category of data. He explained that TMOMs are connected with support equipment which Russia proposed not to include in SFO. Poznihir claimed that TMOMs are functionally different from operational ICBMs and SLBMs and inspectors could verify those differences during inspection. Trout asked where the sides would list the distinguishing features. Poznihir said it would be obvious because there is a hole drilled in them. Trout responded that there are different types of TMOMs which have various distinguishing features and asked where those distinguishing features would be identified. Poznihir said there would not be requirements covering TMOMs in the new arrangement.

¶20. (S) Trout asked how an inspection team would know how many TMOMs were at a base. Poznihir responded that the base would inform the inspection team at the time of inspection.

¶21. (S) Moving on, Poznihir proposed deleting the category "Mobile Training Launchers," since Russia did not have them and did not plan on having them. He explained that Russia used non-deployed launchers for training at training facilities. Trout said the United States would consider deleting the category, but reminded the Russian side that training launchers carry TMOMs and that Russia proposed to delete TMOMs as a category. (Begin comment: Though it was not translated into English, Novikov explained to Poznihir

that this was the U.S. argument because the TMOM on a launcher could not be distinguished from a deployed launcher. End comment.) Poznihir said that if the United States wanted, it could restrict TMOMs at training facilities. Trout responded that the United States was not trying to limit TMOMs, but needed to understand numbers and locations.

POLITICALLY CORRECT
TERMINOLOGY FOR ROAD-MOBILE

¶22. (S) Trout requested clarification as to how Russia proposed to list information under "Road-Mobile ICBM Bases" in Section II. Trout asked how the term "basing area" would be incorporated into the treaty referring to the Russian proposal to delete the terms "restricted area" and

"deployment area." Orlov confirmed that Russia intended to delete the terms "restricted area" and "deployment area."

¶23. (S) Drawing a diagram, Orlov stated that the term "restricted area" would be replaced by the term "basing area" and that launchers would be located in garages within the "basing area." Orlov drew a big circle that he explained was the road-mobile ICBM base. He drew rectangles which he referred to as "basing areas" and one maintenance facility. Inside the "basing area" he drew smaller rectangles which represented fixed structures. Trout requested clarification as to what the fixed structures would be called. Pischulov claimed that the site diagram would reflect the same information but contain different terms. DeNinno used the current reentry vehicle inspection designation process as an example and asked whether the teams would designate using the term "fixed structure." Pischulov responded that teams would designate a "basing area." Poznihir responded that Russia would think about how "fixed structures" would be handled.

¶24. (S) Trout asked about size limits and coordinates in relation to the road-mobile base and the "basing area." Poznihir, Orlov, and Pischulov each replied with different statements after a series of conversations and diagrams. Trout pressed for a better understanding of the size of the base and "basing areas" and the type of coordinates listed in the MOU. Poznihir said the base would not have a size limit.

MORE COUNTING MISSILES AT
THE PRODUCTION FACILITY

¶25. (S) Raising an issue concerning items at production facilities, Trout noted he understood the Russian proposal to use the term "non-deployed ICBM (returned)" but the U.S. position would be to use "non-deployed ICBM." Trout reasoned that the basis for this was the U.S. proposal for a 60-hour advance notification of mobile ICBMs leaving the Votkinsk Production Facility. Poznihir argued that ICBM exits cannot be a part of the Reference Annex because, if the missile had not left the facility it would not yet exist. Poznihir proposed to add either the word "returned" or "leaving." Trout said the United States would think about it, but informed Poznihir that when the United States sends notifications of TRIDENTs leaving it says the "SLBM exits."

HEAVY BOMBERS

¶26. (S) The sides agreed to delete the category "Heavy Bombers Converted for Use as Ground Trainers," but did not agree on categories for heavy bombers. Trout clarified that the United States had no intention of basing different categories of bombers at the same base--heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments would be based separately from heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. Referring to the additional technical data in Annex C, LT Lobner prodded the Russians to explain their rationale behind including so much technical data and, specifically, how such data would support their verification of items subject to the limits of the treaty. The Russian Delegation acknowledged that they could present some further details on this subject at a later time.

¶27. (S) Trout explained that if the Russian side were to accept the U.S. SFO package delivered in Moscow, the United States would accept the Russian proposal for airbases for non-nuclear armaments. Under the package, U.S. bombers would be based at such bases and Russia would have the right to inspect those bombers once a year. In response to confusion over how the package was connected to heavy bomber categories and air bases, Trout explained that, under the current U.S. proposal, a heavy bomber converted to a non-nuclear configuration would no longer be subject to treaty

limitations and, as such, there would be no reason to list an air base for heavy bombers in a non-nuclear configuration. Novikov said that Russia understood that a non-nuclear heavy bomber would not be part of the U.S. central limits just like non-deployed systems but, under the Russian proposal, these bombers would still be a category of data, as well as the bases where the non-nuclear heavy bombers are based.

128. (S) Trout explained that currently the United States would consider heavy bombers converted to a non-nuclear status as eliminated from the treaty. Orlov said that Russia would require verification rights to confirm that converted bombers could not be used for their original purpose.

U.S. REJECTED MERGING
SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES
WITH TEST RANGES

129. (S) Poznihir asked whether the United States was ready to accept the Russian proposal to merge space launch facilities with test ranges in order to increase transparency by making space launch facilities subject to inspection. Trout presented the following U.S. points explaining why the United States would not agree with the proposal:

-- During the third meeting of the MOUWG on September 29, the Russian Delegation introduced a proposal to merge space launch facilities and test ranges. The United States carefully studied the proposal weighing its merits and considering the implications.

-- The United States opposes the idea to merge these two categories of facilities, because they serve two distinctly different purposes.

-- Space launch facilities and test ranges have fundamentally different purposes. Space launch facilities declared under START utilize treaty-accountable missiles that are configured to deliver payloads into the upper atmosphere or outer space and not to test reentry vehicles or other capabilities related to the further development or readiness of SOA, as occurs at test ranges.

-- This fundamental difference explains why the United States has retained the Article V prohibition on flight-testing ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with reentry vehicles from space launch facilities.

-- We have also retained a requirement for test launchers to be located only at test ranges.

-- We want to retain these provisions and avoid any blurring of distinction between a space launch facility and a test range.

-- Since test ranges support the actual testing and deployment of SOA, they should be subject to the inspection regime for START Follow-on, whereas space launch facilities should not be subject to inspection as they represent endeavors unrelated to the objectives of the treaty.

-- Inspectability of test ranges is an important monitoring tool because the SOA located there are used for the development and testing of strategic forces that could become subject to the limitations of the treaty.

-- Conversely, any SOA at space launch facilities must be used for purposes unrelated to the development of SOA. It is important that the activities at space launch facilities not be disrupted by inspection activity.

-- Both types of facilities should be declared in the MOU. Additionally, the SOA located and launched from both types of facilities should be subject to notification.

-- Based on the functional differences and clear distinction in observable application of missile launchers conducted at these facilities, the United States believes it is necessary to retain separate definitions and provisions for each type of facility in the new treaty.

¶30. (S) The Russian side did not pose any questions following the U.S. response.

¶31. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S. Delegation paper containing Talking Points - START Follow-on Treaty MOU, dated October 29, 2009.

-- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text for Annexes A-D, dated October 27, 2009.

-- U.S.-proposed text for Annex J to the MOU, dated October 22, 2009.

¶32. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Trout
LtCol Blevins
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Coussa
Mr. Colby
Mr. DeNinno
LT Lobner
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Mr. Tarrasch
Ms. Cherry (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Orlov
Mr. Leontiev
Col Novikov
Mr. Pischul
Gen Poznihir
Mr. Shevchenko
Ms. Zharkih
Mr. Gayduk (Int)

¶33. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS